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Society’s understanding of a conflict is mediated by information provided in mass media, 
for which researchers stress the importance of analysing media portrays of stakeholders in a 
conflict. We analyze information from the Bolivian press regarding the construction of a road 
crossing the Isiboro-Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS). Using 
stakeholder’s and social network analyses we explore stakeholder’s positions and alliances as 
represented in the media and contrast it with previous scholarly work. We found that some actors 
cited as central in scholar analyses of the conflict are largely absent in the media (e.g., private 
investors, conservationist sector), and that the media tend to present stakeholders as having more 
homogeneous positions than the academic literature does, while also neglecting some important 
alliances in their account. The media also suggests that Indigenous communities are forging 
stronger alliances with urban sectors and civil society, alliances not stressed by researchers. 
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A road to conflict:  Stakeholder’s and social network analysis of the media portrayals of a 
social-environmental conflict in Bolivia 
 
Introduction 
Areas targeted for road expansion face important governance challenges and constitute a 
prominent breeding ground for social-environmental conflicts, particularly in the Global South 
(Raftopoulos 2017; Martinez-Alier et al. 2016). Indeed, infrastructure expansion often involves a 
multiplicity of actors with competing interests, operating at different scales, and with different 
opportunities to influence decision-making, which generates an intricate network of stakeholders 
with opposed views, power differences, and conflictive social interactions (Temper, Demaria, et 
al. 2018; Scheidel et al. 2018; Del Bene et al. 2018; Temper, Walter, et al. 2018; Pérez-Rincón et 
al. 2018). Understanding how these stakeholders relate to each other is critical for conflict 
resolution. Because society’s understanding of the network of stakeholders involved in conflicts 
is largely mediated by information provided in mass media (Slone 2000; Evans 2010), conflict 
research has highlighted the importance of analysing the role of media in shaping inclusive 
governance (Boyle and Schmierbach 2009; Hamelink 2011).   
Conflict research suggests that the media should not be understood as a medium for the 
transmission of neutral information, but rather as a tool that decision-makers employ in order to 
promote their own agendas (e.g., Sampedro Blanco 1997; Stanig 2015; Van Aelst and Walgrave 
2017), or as an independent actor that creates pressures for action on issues it deems newsworthy 
(Patterson 1997; Eberwein et al. 2016). On the one side, the control of media by actors with a 
stake in political affairs often results in selection, coverage, or statement biases in the framing of 
conflicts, contravening the highest standards of journalistic ethics (D'Alessio and Allen 2000). 
Such control might explain the larger visibility of those stakeholders with an agenda favorable to 
media, corporate, or political interests around a particular issue (e.g., Groeling 2013; Eberl et al. 
2015). On the other side, the media might also take a vested interest on particular conflicts 
(Carroll and Hackett 2006; Malinick et al. 2013) and be more likely to report extreme positions 
with a high marketing potential (Klijn 2016). This overall issue of information impartiality has 
profound implications for political power, decision-making, and democracy in general, as it 
determines how conflicts enter the public sphere (Entman 2007; Oliver and Myers 1999). 
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However, while the role of the media is gaining increasing attention in research on armed 
conflicts and wars (e.g., Puddephatt 2006; Weidmann 2015), its role in the context of social-
ecological conflicts is still meagre at best. To contribute to fill that gap, in this work we analyze 
local media portrayal of stakeholders and their characteristics and alliances around a conflict 
arising from an infrastructure development project (i.e., the construction of a paved road) 
planned on an Indigenous territory and national park in South America. 
In the last two decades, South American countries have experienced a high expansion of 
their road networks, mostly to promote regional economic integration (Fernández-Llamazares et 
al. 2018; Laurance and Balmford 2013; Fraser 2014; Gallice et al. 2017; Harvey and Knox 
2015). The construction of such large transportation infrastructures is often contentious. 
Advocates of roads expansion argue that roads provide access to natural resources, facilitate 
market access to rural producers, and enable economic integration (Clements 2013; Saguier and 
Brent 2014; Riggirozzi 2015). In their view, roads reduce the costs of spatial mobility, bringing 
services and economic development to less-economically developed areas (De Lancie 2008; Perz 
et al. 2010; Pellegrina 2014). Opponents claim that road construction causes severe 
environmental impacts through increased deforestation, habitat loss, pollution, illegal hunting, 
and wildlife trade (Coffin 2007; Laurance et al. 2014; Ahmed et al. 2014; Baraloto et al. 2015). 
Furthermore, opponents also argue that roads have high social costs, as they increase land 
insecurity, especially when road construction violates local communities’ customary land rights 
and creates conflicts over natural resources (Van der Ree et al. 2015; Perz et al. 2008).  
Within this context, we focus on the planned construction of a deeply-contested road 
crossing the Isiboro-Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS) in the Bolivian 
Amazon, which has deemed to be one of the highest-profile social-environmental conflicts in the 
history of South America (Hope 2016; Fernández-Llamazares et al. 2018).  Specifically, we 
explore 1) which stakeholders of the TIPNIS conflict are portrayed by the media, 2) how their 
position and involvement in the conflict is represented, and 3) how relations amongst 
stakeholders are represented. We then contrast this information with previous scholarly work in 
the area to discern differences between the narratives portrayed by the media and the findings in 
the academic literature. We conclude discussing the main strategies and discourses employed by 
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the lowland Indigenous communities of TIPNIS in their efforts to attract media visibility and 
influence decision-making against the road construction. 
Case Study  
 TIPNIS Social-Environmental Context 
The Isiboro Sécure Indigenous Territory and National Park (TIPNIS) is located on the 
eastern slope of the Andes, between the departments of Beni (Moxos province) and Cochabamba 
(Chapare province). This unique biogeographic region, extremely rich in wildlife, is known as 
one of the most biodiverse regions on earth (Hoorn et al. 2010; Fernández and Altamirano 2004). 
The TIPNIS covers 1,236,296 ha of which 88% have the dual protection status of National Park 
(granted in 1965 to the full area) and Native Community Land (TCO in Spanish, granted in 
1990). The 12% of the National Park which does not overlap with the TCO is referred to as 
Polygon 7 (Figure 1). Despite such dual protection status, the area suffers important 
environmental threats, including the expansion of coca farming (Siles 2009; Fernández-
Llamazares et al. 2018; Lilienfeld and Pauquet 2005) and oil and gas exploration (Fernandez-
Llamazares and Rocha 2015), activities that would largely benefit from the construction of the 




Figure 1.TIPNIS demarcation and location of the planned road, based on the map of the 
Instituto Nacional de la Reforma Agraria (INRA). 
  
The national park is mostly inhabited by lowland groups distributed along the Isiboro and 
Sécure rivers and by some highland groups in the southern piedmont region. About 12,000 
lowland Indigenous Peoples from the Mojeño, Yuracaré, and Tsimane’ groups live in 64 
communities with legally recognized communal rights over land overlapping with the National 
Park. Despite their sociocultural particularities, lowland Indigenous groups mostly rely on 
subsistence activities, including small-scale agriculture, hunting, fishing, and gathering. The 
political organization of lowland Indigenous Peoples is articulated around two representative 
bodies: the Subcentral Sécure (representing lowland Indigenous communities settled around the 
Sécure River) and the Subcentral TIPNIS (representing all lowland Indigenous communities 
within TIPNIS), both of which are part of the Confederación de Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia 
(CIDOB), the main umbrella organization for Bolivian lowland Indigenous Peoples.  
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In the southernmost part, within the Cochabamba Department and close to the coca-
producing area of Chapare, the National Park is inhabited by Aymara and Quechua colonizers 
from the Bolivian highlands and the Chapare region. These communities, locally known as 
‘colonists’ and more recently as ‘interculturals’, migrated to the area from the 1970s onwards 
and began to produce cacao, bananas, cassava, maize, citrus fruits and, most notably, coca. With 
time, their numbers increased and they started encroaching into the Park, a situation that led to 
the drawing of a ‘red line’ marking the boundary between the National Park and the lands of 
lowland Indigenous groups on one side and the area occupied by the colonizers on the other. In 
2009, Polygon 7 was separated from the demarcated territory granted to lowland Indigenous 
groups. In Polygon 7 individual land titles were granted to farmers and the area was officially 
recognized as distinct from the TIPNIS (Webber 2012). The area is now mainly populated by 
about 100,000 people who live in permanent settlements and rely on market-oriented economic 
activities, notably coca cultivation (McNeish 2013; Lalander 2017). Colonizers are organized in 
52 agrarian trade unions and participate in one of the six federations of Chapare coca producers, 
Federaciones del Trópico, for which the current president of Bolivia, Evo Morales, is a leader 
(Grisaffi 2010). They also participate in the Indigenous Council of the South (CONISUR for its 
Spanish acronym), an organization representing 21 communities who live close or inside 
Polygon 7 (Von Stosch 2014). 
Villa Tunari - San Ignacio de Moxos Road Project: The TIPNIS Conflict (2009-2012) 
In 2000, the Union of South American nations launched a trans-regional development 
strategy to link South America’s economies through new transportation, energy, and 
telecommunications projects (Zibechi 2006; van Dijck 2008).  The strategy, known as Initiative 
for the Integration of the Regional Infrastructure of South America (IIRSA), is expected to 
integrate the region’s road networks, river ways, hydroelectric dams, and telecommunications to 
allow greater trade across the region (Lalander 2017; Veltmeyer and Petras 2014). The TIPNIS 
road was part of this initiative. 
Although the plan for the TIPNIS road dates back to the early 2000s (Lilienfeld and 
Pauquet 2005), the conflict around its construction only sparked around 2009, when the Bolivian 
government signed a contract with a Brazilian company for the construction of a highway 
connecting Villa Tunari (Cochabamba) and San Ignacio de Moxos (Beni) (Figure 1). The road 
8 
 
was planned in three sections, with Section II traversing the TIPNIS core area. Section II was 
contentious from the onset for two reasons established by the Bolivian Constitution. First, given 
its legal status as a National Park, infrastructure development was not allowed in the area. 
Second, given its legal status as an Indigenous territory, the project required the Free, Prior and 
Informed Consent (FPIC) of the local Indigenous communities (Achtenberg 2013), but this right 
was violated by the Bolivian Government (McNeish 2013). 
After several months of frustrated negotiation in which conservationists and lowland 
Indigenous Peoples’ representatives attempted to persuade the government to abort the project, 
the opposition to the road construction reached its peak in August 2011, when about 1,000 
lowland Indigenous Peoples marched from Trinidad to La Paz, covering 600 km, in their attempt 
to stop the road construction (VIII Indigenous March; see Supplementary Materials, S1). 
Simultaneously, intercultural federations and individuals intensified activities supporting the 
road. On September 25th 2011, road supporters blocked the VIII Indigenous March and the police 
exerted a brutal repression against marchers. The incident awakened the interests of international 
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and human rights observers and increased the social 
support to the March (Petherick 2011). When the VIII March reached La Paz in October 19th, 
road opponents were strong enough to push the government to promulgate a law attributing 
TIPNIS the status of strictly protected, or untouchable (‘intangible’ in Spanish), making the area 
out of bounds for all future forms of state or development projects (Law 180 of TIPNIS, 
Delgado-Pugley 2013). 
Soon after, CONISUR organized a ‘countermarch’ with the participation of around 2,000 
people in favour of the road. When, after two months of walking, this ‘countermarch’ arrived to 
La Paz in February 2012, the government promulgated a new law, the 222 Consultation Law, 
according to which the government would consult the inhabitants of TIPNIS about the planned 
road construction (Gaceta Oficial del Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia, 2012). In response, 
lowland Indigenous Peoples organized another march (the IX Indigenous March) to demand the 
abolishment of the Consultation Law, although this time negotiations were unsuccessful and the 
marchers faced a new wave of repression (Fabricant and Postero 2015).  
Consultation was undertaken under an exceptionally high pressure (Fontana and Grugel 
2016) and the results obtained (i.e., 80% of the TIPNIS communities supported the road 
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construction) have been highly contested, with reports showing that many communities had 
never been consulted or had been coerced or manipulated (FIDH and APDHB 2013; Lalander 
2017). After the consultation, the conflict entered a dormant phase that recently ended following 
the promulgation of a law annulling the TIPNIS untouchable status in August 2017 (Amazon 
Watch 2017).  
Methodology 
We collected information from the Bolivian press about the TIPNIS conflict focusing in 
the years 2011 and 2012, the period of major visibility of the conflict in the media. We analysed 
this information combining stakeholder analysis (hereinafter SA) and social network analysis 
(hereinafter SNA) (Lienert et al. 2013). We defined stakeholders as actors who will be affected 
by or can influence decision-making processes towards a concrete goal. Stakeholders can be 
individuals but more commonly are public or private organizations, such as international 
organisations, governments, NGOs, businesses, and local communities (Mayers 2005). Previous 
work shows that stakeholders differ in their capacities and resources, including political, 
financial, cognitive, and moral (Dingwerth and Pattberg 2009). We use SA to identify 1) which 
of the stakeholders affected or being affected by the TIPNIS road are featured by the media and 
2) how their participation and position in TIPNIS-related events is presented. We then use SNA 
to identify the relations amongst different stakeholders portrayed by the media through the 
featuring of stakeholder participation in different conflict-related events (e.g., marches, protests, 
meetings). 
Sampling and Data Collection 
We followed a two steps sampling procedure. In the first step we identified stakeholders 
in the conflict and in the second step we collected information on media portrayal of 
stakeholders’ position, visibility, and relations. To identify stakeholders in the TIPNIS conflict 
we selected four standard, broadsheet, general-interest, paid-for newspapers in Bolivia: two at 
national and two at regional levels. Following Quandt (2008), our selection of newspapers was 
based on (1) orientation towards professionalized “high-quality” journalism; (2) market 
leadership and high circulation rates; and (3) available in electronic format through online 
repositories. We deliberately excluded special monothematic newspapers (e.g., financial 
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newspapers), tabloids, freesheets, and regional newspapers in departments other than 
Cochabamba or Beni. The selected journals were La Razón and Página Siete (national level) and 
La Palabra del Beni (department of Beni) and Los Tiempos (department of Cochabamba). For 
each journal, we screened all the titles of press articles in the policy section appearing between 
1/01/2011 and 31/12/2012, and read all the articles related to the TIPNIS conflict. Following our 
definition of stakeholder, we noted all the individuals, groups, and organizations that could 
affect, be affected, or had publicly expressed a position about the construction of the TIPNIS 
road.  
In the second step of the sampling procedure, we chose one newspaper to gather 
information on how stakeholder’s participation and position in TIPNIS-related events is 
portrayed. We selected La Palabra del Beni, a departmental newspaper published in Trinidad, 
renowned for its clear opposition to the government and its support for increasing departmental 
autonomy. La Palabra del Beni was selected for three reasons. First, it constitutes the highest-
circulation regional newspaper in the study area, thus having greater potential to exert social 
influence at both local and regional levels. Second, it is the only regional newspaper in the Beni 
Department with a complete online repository. And third, it is the only regional newspaper that is 
not owned by, or directly connected to, any political figure or party. We retrieved all the articles 
mentioning the TIPNIS conflict and stored them in Nvivo 11. We read all the retrieved articles 
and we noted the following information: 1) type of event described (e.g., demonstration, 
meeting) and 2) stakeholder’s position in the event regarding the road construction (i.e., 
supportive, neutral, or adverse). We entered information in a database where each row 
corresponded to an actor/article (where multiple actors mentioned in an article are listed in 
different rows). 
Data Analysis 
We used contextual information provided in the newspapers to classify stakeholders 
according to two criteria: sector and geographical scale. Thus, stakeholders were classified as 
representing the interest of 1) the administration (e.g., Executive, local government), 2) 
Indigenous Peoples (e.g., Subcentral TIPNIS, CIDOB), 3) the civil society (e.g., NGOs, social 
movements), or 4) other sectors (e.g., researchers, international institutions). Stakeholders were 
also classified according to the geographical scale at which they primarily operate: 1) local (e.g., 
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Mayor of Villa Tunari), 2) regional (e.g., regional government of Cochabamba), 3) national (e.g., 
Bolivian Senate), or 4) international (e.g., foreign investors). Such categories have a purely 
analytical purpose, as –in real life– stakeholders might represent more than a single sector and/or 
operate at different scales. 
Events featured in the news were classified as dialogue (e.g., meetings) or unilateral 
events (e.g., claims, protests, rallies, demonstrations, or marches). We define dialogue events as 
instances in which multiple actors converge to exchange opinions and unilateral events as 
actions organized to assert a particular position in the conflict (Routledge 2003). We differentiate 
between these categories because unilateral events might represent a higher degree of alliance 
and collaboration between stakeholders than meetings. 
We also aggregated information to create three variables capturing stakeholder’s position, 
visibility, and participation in the TIPNIS conflict (Varvasovszky and Brugha 2000; Schmeer 
1999). Position refers to whether a particular stakeholder is featured as supporting or rejecting 
the road construction and was calculated by aggregating information from all the press articles 
reviewed in which the actor was mentioned into four categories: supporters, or stakeholders 
whose position was featured as supportive in at least 30% of the mentions; opponents, or 
stakeholders whose position was featured as adverse in at least 30% of the mentions; neutral, or 
stakeholders whose position was featured as neutral in at least 30% of the mentions; and 
ambiguous, or stakeholders who simultaneously had at least 30% of the mentions as supportive 
and 30% as adverse.  
Visibility refers to the stakeholder’s presence on the media in relation to the TIPNIS 
conflict and was measured as the share of days the stakeholder was mentioned from the total 
number of days when La Palabra del Beni had an article on the conflict. Based on the 
distribution of the values in this variable, we defined five values: major (when the stakeholder 
was mentioned in >5% of events), high (between 5% and 2.5%), regular (2.5% to 1.5%), low 
(1.5% to 0.5%), and minor visibility (less than 0.5%).  
Lastly, participation refers to the percentage of events -from the total list of TIPNIS-
related events- in which a stakeholder had reportedly participated. To estimate the participation 
of a stakeholder, we constructed a two-mode network (or stakeholder_by_event affiliation 
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network) in which the rows are the stakeholders and the columns the events. A value of 1 in a 
cell of this binary matrix means that that actor X participated in event Z (Halgin et al. 2014; 
Diani and Kousis 2014). We imputed data from the stakeholder_by_event affiliation network 
into UCINET 6 to generate two visualizations of how the regional press has presented 
stakeholders’ participation in TIPNIS related unilateral and dialogue events. We also calculated 
the share of events in which each stakeholder had participated. Based on the distribution of this 
variable, we defined four levels of participation: very high (stakeholder who participated in 
>30% of events), high (10% to 30%), medium (3% to 10%), and low participation (3%).  
Drawing on the affiliation network stakeholder-by-event we created the stakeholder-by-
stakeholder squared matrix of overlaps through the cross-product method (Hanneman and Riddle 
2005). This matrix depicts how many stakeholders were featured as present in the same events 
and is our measure of network relation, as co-participation in events is considered a network tie 
in the analysis of policy networks (Fischer and Sciarini 2016; Leifeld and Schneider 2012). We 
then conducted a one-mode core-periphery analysis to the stakeholder-by-stakeholder matrix 
(Borgatti and Everett 1999) to discern between the set of actors who are closely related (i.e., 
have high density of ties amongst themselves by sharing many events in common, the core) from 
the actors who are less related because they have participated in few events in common (i.e., the 
periphery). The analysis allows to picture differences in stakeholders’ capacities to coordinate 
actions: actors in the core have a structural advantage compared with actors in the periphery 
because they are better able to coordinate their actions (Hanneman and Riddle 2005).  
Results 
Stakeholders Analysis 
In the systematic reading of the 2011-2012 numbers from the four newspapers we 
identified 34 different stakeholders (Supplementary Materials, S2). Out of the 34 stakeholders 
identified in the press, 14 represent different levels of the public administration (i.e., three 
stakeholders represent the local, two the regional, and nine the national level), 10 represent the 
civil society (four regional, five national, and one international), six stakeholders represent 
Indigenous Peoples and local community organizations (three local and three national), and four 
stakeholders represent other sectors at national (two) and international (two) levels. Thus, overall 
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most (n=19) stakeholders represent the national scale, whereas only six represent the local and 
other six the regional levels. All together, we only found three stakeholders at the international 
level. 
The systematic reading of La Palabra del Beni resulted in a total of 4,059 TIPNIS-related 
press articles: 1,701 articles published in 2011 and 2,358 in 2012. In these articles, there were a 
total of 336 citations regarding stakeholder’s participation in 103 TIPNIS-related events. Out of 
the 103 TIPNIS-related events identified, 50 correspond to dialogue events (i.e., meetings) and 
the other 53 correspond to unilateral events (i.e., claims, protests, activities, and the three 
aforementioned marches). 
Overall, La Palabra del Beni portrayed stakeholder’s positions regarding the road 
construction as largely divided: 12 stakeholders supported the construction of the road, 12 
opposed it, six were neutral, and four were ambiguous (Figure 2, see also Supplementary 
Materials, S2). Stakeholders portrayed as supporting the construction of the road include the 
public administration (i.e., the national government, the Cochabamba government, the mayor of 
Villa Tunari), representatives of highland groups (i.e., CONISUR, Federaciones del Trópico, 
intercultural organizations), and the private sector (i.e., national enterprises and foreign 
investors). Stakeholders portrayed as opposing the construction of the road include lowland 
Indigenous Peoples organizations (i.e., Subcentral TIPNIS and Sécure, part of CIDOB), social 
movements, NGOs, and some members of the public administration (i.e., opposition deputies 
and senators, major of Trinidad). Stakeholders portrayed as neutral include four representing the 
national administration (i.e., executive-ministers, senate from the Movimiento al Socialismo 
(MAS), judicial authority, and ombudsman), national researchers, and international 
organizations. Stakeholders portrayed as ambiguous are from the public administration (i.e., 
deputies MAS, Regional government Beni, and National Service of Protected Areas) and 




Figure 2.Stakeholder’s visibility, participation, and position regarding the road 
construction (after La Palabra del Beni). 
 
La Palabra del Beni gave major visibility to six stakeholders (i.e., four Indigenous 
organizations and two stakeholders of the public administration) (Figure 2), high visibility to nine 
stakeholders: deputies from MAS and from the opposition, the judicial authority (who played a 
main role in the development and interpretation of the laws regarding the road through TIPNIS), 
and intercultural organizations. Other actors given high visibility were the local government of 
Beni, national NGOs, and the COB. Seven stakeholders received regular visibility: two 
stakeholders from the public administration at the national level (i.e., senate-MAS and the 
Ombudsman), two stakeholders from the civil society (i.e., Civic Committee of Beni, analysts, 
and national researchers), and international institutions, who mainly engaged as international 
observers during the marches and the consultation process. The newspaper gave low visibility to 
six stakeholders, including three stakeholders belonging to the administration sector (i.e., the 
mayor of San Ignacio de Moxos, the local government of Cochabamba, and the protected areas 
service, SERNAP) and three stakeholders from the civil society (i.e, Federaciones del Trópico, 
hauliers and social movements). Finally, the newspaper gave minor visibility to the mayors of 
Villa Tunari and Trinidad, the senate-opposition, the Civic Committee of Cochabamba, the 
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national enterprises, and the Federación de Ganaderos del Beni y Pando (FEGABENI), i.e., a 
regional association of cattle ranchers. 
Overall, Figure 2 shows that La Palabra del Beni portrays supporters as stakeholders 
with medium to high participation and operating from local to national scales. The newspapers 
give supporters minor to high levels of visibility. Minor visibility was given to supporters 
operating at local and regional scales. In contrast, opponents appear as more scattered, with one 
group of stakeholders operating from local to national scale with a very high participation, and 
another group operating at the national scale and mostly with an urban profile having lower 
participation. Opponents are generally given some of the highest levels of visibility. Neutral and 
ambiguous stakeholders, only operating at national or international scales, appear as having 
medium levels of participation, but are given major to high visibility.    
The 34 stakeholders had a total of 336 references in the 103 TIPNIS-related events 
identified, but participation levels differed widely between actors. For example, the Subcentral 
TIPNIS was featured as participating in 41 of the events identified, while FEGABENI did not 
appear as participating in any. Our data suggest that road opponents were featured as 
participating in more events than road advocates. Thus, the three actors within the category of 
very high participation represent lowland Indigenous groups: Subcentral TIPNIS (which 
appeared as participating in 41 of the 103 identified events), CIDOB (39 events) and Subcentral 
Sécure (35 events). These three stakeholders were present in more than 30% of the events and 
were also portrayed as having high visibility. Within the high participation category, we found 
eight stakeholders belonging to the Indigenous, administration, and civil society sectors and 
featured as supporters, opponents, neutral, and ambiguous. All stakeholders with high 
participation were also portrayed as having major visibility except social movements, who had a 
low visibility despite their high participation. Note also that executive-President was the only 
stakeholder identified as major visibility but low participation (11.76%). A heterogeneous group 
of 14 stakeholders from multiple sectors and positions were featured as having medium 
participation. Similarly, the category of low participation included nine stakeholders from all 
positions and different levels of visibility (except major visibility). Finally, La Palabra del Beni 




The Stakeholder-by-Event Social Network 
We used information from the stakeholder-by-event social network to compare the 
ranking of the stakeholders in terms of degree among the network of dialogue events, the 
network of unilateral events, and the complete network. We found that the top ten stakeholders 
of the complete network of events (n=103) are the same than those represented in the network of 
dialogue events (N=50), with slight changes in the ranking. Moreover, eight of the top ten 
stakeholders of the complete network are also represented in the network of unilateral events 
(N=53) (Supplementary Materials, S3). The two new stakeholders in the unilateral network are 
the Civic Committee of Beni (opponent), and national researchers (neutral), with ranks 7 and 8 
respectively.  
Given the similarity of the stakeholders across the three networks, we created a 
visualization of how La Palabra del Beni presented stakeholders’ participation in TIPNIS events 
(both dialogue and unilateral) (Figure 3). In that figure, node size shows degree centrality (i.e., 
the number of direct links between stakeholders and events), so the bigger a stakeholder node 
(coloured nodes), the more events had the stakeholder attended, and the bigger the event node 
(grey nodes), the more stakeholders have participated in the event. The results presented in 
Figure 3 suggest that the three lowland Indigenous organizations that oppose the road (i.e., 
Subcentral Sécure, Subcentral TIPNIS and a sector of CIDOB) have participated in more events 
than the other stakeholders. From those supporting the road construction, the two stakeholders 
participating in more events are the Executive (President) and CONISUR. It is worth noticing 
that, while the opponents seem to participate together in many events, there are also a substantial 
number of small events in which only few actors participate. Interestingly, none of the events 
seem to have a degree centrality much larger than the others, indicating that through the period 
of analysis, the conflict was characterized by a high number of events attended by specific 




Figure 3.Bipartite graph of the two-mode networkstakeholder-by-eventof the TIPNIS 
conflict.Note:Coloured nodes are the stakeholders (red: opponents; green: supporters; 
blue: neutral; and brown: ambiguous) and greynodes are the events (squares: 
dialogues; triangles: unilateral events). Node size shows degree centrality (i.e., the 
numberof direct links between stakeholders and events). 
 
The results of the stakeholder-by-stakeholder core-periphery analysis confirm previous 
results. Figure 4 shows a core composed by a group of opponents (i.e., Subcentral TIPNIS, 
Subcentral Sécure, and CIDOB) (density of connections= 26.67; fitness= 0.833), who are all 
very likely to co-participate in a considerable number of events (either dialogue or unilateral). 
Although to a lesser extent, opponents were also connected to the core group of road supporters 
(i.e., CONISUR and Executive president) as the two groups participated in dialogue events. The 
remaining 29 stakeholders had a lower number of ties between them (density of connections= 
0.5) indicating that they are featured as co-participating in fewer events. These actors conforms 






Figure 4.Stakeholder-by-stakeholder network.Note:The strength of the tie represents 
co-participation in events:the thicker the tie, the more events two actors have in 
common. The node color represents stakeholder’s position (red:opponents; green: 
supporters; blue: neutral; brown: ambiguous) and the size stakeholder’s visibility (the 
bigger the node,the more visibility had the stakeholder). 
 
Discussion 
Bolivian newspapers portray a high plurality of stakeholders with different positions in 
the TIPNIS conflict, but –through the selection of the events reported and the actors mentioned– 
it also grants more visibility to some stakeholders than to others and provides a particular view of 
the relations between different actors. To understand the role of media in shaping public opinion, 
in this section, we compare media portrayals of stakeholders in the TIPNIS conflict with 
information from previous scholarly work on the topic. Being such a high-profile social-
environmental conflict, the topic has received considerable attention in scholarly work. Some 
authors have analysed the conflict using a political economy approach that highlights the social 
tensions between extractivism, Indigenous rights, and nature conservation (Hope 2016; Fabricant 
19 
 
and Postero 2015), others have addressed the contradictions in Bolivia’s politics of indigeneity 
(McNeish 2013; Canessa 2014; Laing 2015), and others have taken a conservation angle (e.g., 
Fernández-Llamazares et al. 2018).  Overall, this literature clearly shows that there is a 
complexity of local, regional, national, and international actors as well as of social, material, and 
territorial interest around the planned construction of the road (see McNeish 2013).  The question 
is whether the media portrays this complexity in the same terms and scope. 
Stakeholders’ Diversity  
Much in line with previous scholarly work (e.g., McNeish 2013), the media portrays a 
high diversity of actors with a stake on the TIPNIS conflict. Thus, although the media presents 
lowland Indigenous Peoples and the Bolivian central government as the central actors in the 
conflict, it also features a large number of other stakeholders with some level of participation in 
it. The diversity of stakeholders portrayed in the press, together with the fact that they represent 
multiple social sectors (e.g., administration, Indigenous Peoples, civil society, and other sectors) 
and geographical scales (i.e., local, regional, national, and international), confirms the strategic 
importance of the planned road beyond local and regional levels (Hope 2016; Fernández-
Llamazares et al. 2018). There are, however, two important differences between the media 
representation of stakeholder’s diversity and results from previous scholarly work. First, some 
actors appearing as central in the academic literature of the conflict are largely absent in the 
media. And second, the media tends to present more homogeneous positions towards the road 
than the academic literature on the conflict. We elaborate on each of these two points.  
Some of the stakeholders that have been singled out as having a central role in scholarly 
analysis of the TIPNIS conflict have a peripheral role in media portrayals. For example, 
researchers have discussed the critical role of foreign investors in the road construction (Laing 
2015; Sanchez-Lopez 2015). However, in our analysis of press articles, foreign investors have 
low visibility and low participation in public events. The discrepancy might be explained by the 
fact that the media tends to focus on vocal actors (Carroll and Hackett 2006; Malinick et al. 
2013) and extreme positions (Klijn 2016), and foreign investors probably do not fit these 
categories. Moreover, considering that most media reports largely focus on events happening in 
the public sphere, it is not surprising that some actors operating beyond the media spotlight 
might have remained invisible. 
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Similarly, while the literature on the topic has often portrayed the conflict in terms of the 
social tensions between extractivism, Indigenous rights, and nature conservation (Hope 2016; 
Fabricant and Postero 2015), stakeholders in the conservation sector (i.e., conservation 
organizations and SERNAP, the public institution for the management of Bolivia’s protected 
areas) were not portrayed as central by the media. Given that local and international 
environmental NGOs have often been the strategic allies of Indigenous People’s fights for their 
land rights across the Amazon (e.g., Schwartzman and Zimmerman 2005; Postero 2007; Earle 
and Pratt 2009), this finding is indeed surprising. In fact, this mismatch might be a result of the 
contradictory actions of the Bolivian government regarding environmental issues. Thus, while 
Bolivia recognized Pachamama’s (i.e., Mother Earth) rights in its 2009 Constitution, the 
Government has recurrently attacked and threatened several environmental organizations. For 
example, President Evo Morales threatened to expel any NGO or foundation attempting to 
obstruct the exploitation of the country’s natural resources (Fernández-Llamazares & Rocha 
2015); and in 2015, Vice-president Álvaro García Linera attacked four well-respected Bolivian 
research organizations (i.e., Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo Rural y Agrario (CEDLA), 
Centro de Información y Documentación Bolivia (CEDIB), Fundación Tierra, and Fundación 
Milenio), accusing them of political meddling to advance the interests of foreign governments 
and corporations using foreign funds to promote colonial interests around environmental 
protection. While many academics have been bewildered by these developments and extensively 
written about them in both academic publications and the international press (e.g., Fernández-
Llamazares and Rocha 2015), these tensions have remained relatively unspoken in the Bolivian 
press. 
We also found that the press tends to present stakeholder’s position in a more 
homogeneous way than scholarly work does. For example, in contrast with information 
presented in scholarly accounts of the conflict (e.g., Hope 2016), the media largely features 
lowland Indigenous Peoples as a homogeneous, unified block in their opposition to the road. 
Previous work based on ethnographic data suggests that the situation is much more complex, 
with certain representatives of the lowland Indigenous Peoples under CIDOB, the sub-centrals of 
the TIPNIS, and the Central de Pueblos Étnicos Mojeños del Beni (CPEM-B, a stakeholder 
which was not even mentioned in the media) having decided to support the road, often with 
explicit political aspirations (Hope 2016). Moreover, in addition to portraying their position as 
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static and homogeneous, the media tends to assume that the opinion of all lowland Indigenous 
Peoples is legitimately represented by the voices of a limited number of Indigenous leaders and 
representatives. While this could certainly be the case, researchers working in other contexts 
have noted that there are often discrepancies between the attitudes of local leaders and local 
communities towards infrastructure development (i.e., Denton 2002; Ogra 2008; Ogra 2012; 
Bhattarai et al. 2015; Jost et al. 2016), as well as disconnection between the leadership and base 
when it comes to activism (Shah 2010; Lucero 2008). These findings suggest that the media 
could be providing a biased portrayal of stakeholders’ positions. Overall, the voices of lay people 
from the Indigenous communities within TIPNIS remained largely unheard in most of the press 
articles surveyed. 
Stakeholders’ Network 
The complexity of relations established among stakeholders as portrayed by the media 
sits well within the literature reporting that Indigenous groups in remote parts of the Amazon are 
able to martial international support for the defense of their rights (e.g., Ramos 1994; Conklin 
and Graham 1995; Turner 2008). Thus, the media portrays the three lowland Indigenous 
organizations opposing the project (i.e., Subcentral TIPNIS, Subcentral Sécure, and CIDOB) as 
the core of the network of stakeholders in the TIPNIS conflict. In other words, the media 
portrayals of actors’ networks suggest that stakeholders localized far from political and urban 
centres and having limited electoral relevance can gain high visibility in a conflict arguably 
through their connectivity with other stakeholders. Thus, using the structural advantage that 
derives from being at the core of the stakeholders’ network (Hanneman and Riddle 2005), 
lowland Indigenous organizations might have sparked high levels of social mobilization around 
them, i.e., the two marches in defence of TIPNIS (Lorenzo 2011), managing to upscale their 
struggles from the local to the global (for similar examples see Martin 2003; Sikor and Newell 
2014; de la Cuadra 2015; Januchowski-Hartley et al. 2016). 
Media representation of stakeholders’ alliances also points at interesting associations that, 
to our best knowledge, have not been discussed in the academic literature. Thus, our results show 
that lowland Indigenous organizations at the core of the TIPNIS conflict have been able to amass 
support from urban sectors and the broader civil society. These alliances present an interesting 
venue in which to focus further research, as they suggest that Indigenous Peoples are expanding 
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the type of stakeholders who had previously supported Indigenous struggles in the Amazon, i.e., 
mostly peasant organizations and local and international environmental NGOs (e.g., Tanaka 
2012; Villanueva 2013).  Indeed, such new alliances might indicate that Indigenous 
organizations involved in this conflict are articulating their fights around issues of social equity 
(Robinson 2003; Orta-Martínez and Finer 2010; Veltmeyer and Bowles 2014; de la Cuadra 
2015; Temper et al. 2015), and therefore getting closer to the “environmental justice” discourse 
(Martinez-Alier et al. 2016) than to the “conservationist” discourse. Such discourse shift 
certainly deserves more scholarly attention. 
As with the role assigned to stakeholders, media portrays of stakeholders relations do not 
make visible some of the important alliances driving the conflict. For example, President Evo 
Morales, one of the most vocal defenders of the road, has long been a leader of Federaciones del 
Trópico, Chapare’s organization of coca producers (Grisaffi 2010). However, this association 
does not appear in the results from our SNA. On the contrary, the close links between the 
President and the federations of coca producers has been highlighted in the academic literature 
(e.g., Fernández-Llamazares et al. 2018), with several authors suggesting that, given the interest 
of coca producers in the TIPNIS area, such association has played a significant role in the way in 
which the conflict has be officially addressed (Laing 2015; Wickstrom 2013). 
Conclusion 
In this article we have analysed information released in the Bolivian press between 2011 
and 2012 in relation to the conflict over the construction of a road through TIPNIS and discussed 
how results of this analysis compare with scholarly information of the same conflict. We found 
two important differences in the information on the TIPNIS conflict reported in the academic 
literature and the information portrayed in the Bolivian press. First, some actors cited as central 
in scholarly analyses of the conflict are largely absent in the media (e.g., private investors, 
conservationist sector). And second, the media tend to present stakeholders as having more 
homogeneous positions towards the road than the academic literature does, while also neglecting 
some important alliances in their account. Another finding that is distilled from our analysis of 
the TIPNIS conflict is that Indigenous communities in the Bolivian Amazon are expanding the 
scope of their claims from the local to the global, increasingly engaging with the discourse of 
environmental justice, and forging new alliances with urban sectors and civil society. Place-
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based analyses such as the one presented in this paper hold the potential to uncover the 
potentialities and prefigurative politics of an emerging global movement for environmental 
justice (Martinez-Alier et al. 2016; Temper, Demaria, et al. 2018). They can help us to better 
understand, contest, and transform different forms of hegemonic power, and to ground in socio-
political realities the epistemologies and ontologies of the numerous Indigenous communities 
impacted by the most explosive era of road expansion in human history (Laurance et al. 2014; 
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